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Angel Asensio, CEPN, Université Paris 13 – CNRS 
March 2006 
 
Abstract 
 
Because it was designed for efficient stationary regimes, the New-Consensus 
Macroeconomic governance carries several drawbacks when implemented in 
Keynesian non-ergodic regimes. As long as Keynesian unemployment is interpreted 
in terms of 'natural' rate, it serves as a macroeconomic policy target in such a way 
that the policy mix may anchor the system far from full employment. We develop an 
argument that suggests a Keynesian explanation (which involves inappropriate 
economic policy) of what New Keynesians have referred to as unemployment 
hysteresis. However, difficulties do not vanish when authorities adopt the Keynesian 
vision of the world, for policy makers also have to deal with uncertainty. In contrast 
with the automatic economic-policy rules of the New Consensus Macroeconomics 
(NCM), we put forward a Keynesian pragmatic and progressive approach, based on 
intermediate targets designed with respect to the confidence that authorities have in 
the chances of success (which depends on the context and moves with it). Monetary 
and budgetary-fiscal policy interactions are discussed in such a context. Even if the 
monetary policy ability to reduce interest rates and increase effective demand is 
doubtful, it matters indirectly through avoiding increases in interest rates when fiscal 
and budgetary policy aims to stimulate effective demand. 
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1. Introduction 
According to the New Consensus Macroeconomics (NCM), economic policy deals 
with different problems depending on the length of the period considered. 
If the period is long enough, competitive forces drive the rate of unemployment to 
the 'natural level'. Theoretically, a succession of such periods should not exhibit 
statistical evidence of unemployment pressure on wages or consumer prices; the 
Phillips relation should look vertical. In each of these 'long periods', expected prices 
variations equal the effective values, and contracts are negotiated in accordance with 
the right expectations. That is the reason why systematic (hence expected) 
stimulations of aggregate demand1 do not reduce real wages and unemployment; they 
only strengthen inflation. 
By contrast, in Keynesian effective-demand led systems, it is doubtful that market 
forces spontaneously guide the system towards a natural equilibrium in the long run. 
Equilibrium is embedded in a changing and uncertain context which makes 
expectations a poor device for decision making because there is no predictable trend 
or trajectory. Keynesian analysis breaks with the idea that expectations tend to be 
right when the length of the periods is extended. It breaks also with the idea that, 
over the defined 'long periods', contracts are negotiated on the basis of right 
expectations. The 'long run' which is required for the Phillips curve to be vertical 
simply makes no sense in such a context. 
The breakdown between the two approaches is less evident in the short run since 
they agree on the positive impact of aggregate demand policies. Let us summarize 
the NCM argument. Because the adjustment of wages to the state of affairs takes 
more time, an inverse relation between the rate of variation in wages and the 
magnitude of the deviation from the natural rate of unemployment can be observed. 
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Inflation plays a decisive role here (provided it has not been expected) because it 
reduces the real wages, and makes it acceptable for firms to respond to an increase in 
demand for goods and services. 
In a recent post-Keynesian perspective, Kriesler & Lavoie [2005], following 
Freedman, Harcourt & Kriesler [2004] and Palacio-Vera [2002], suggested that 
capacity utilization only influences inflation when its level is very low or when there 
is full capacity utilization. Making such an assumption within a standard NCM 
model, which encompasses an IS demand function and a monetary reaction function 
à la Taylor, implies that for a large range of capacity utilization, the monetary policy 
influences the rate of capacity utilization, not inflation. In this case, excess of 
productive capacity makes it possible for firms to increase production and 
employment in response to an increasing effective demand without having to pay 
more attractive nominal wages, and without need for lowering the real cost of labour 
through inflation. Notice that the contrast with the NCM fades if one makes the 
reasonable assumption that inflationary pressures begins before the full capacity 
utilization is reached2. 
Following these considerations one could think that Keynesians agree with the 
new consensus as far as short run economic behaviour is considered. But this idea is 
wrong, since the 'short period' makes no sense except with reference to the 'long 
period' of the NCM. 'Short periods' only reveal deviations from the 'long run' 
equilibrium path, accidents that markets forces will correct even without the help of 
economic policy. On the contrary, in a Keynesian world, equilibrium never is a 
temporary anomaly; it is a stable solution of the economic system, which is more or 
less distant from full employment depending on the level of effective demand, and 
which moves according to it. 
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Such a disagreement about the nature of the economic equilibrium had to deliver 
diverging assessments of economic policy. While the ones see a simple smoothing 
device devoted to stabilize the system around a presumed natural trajectory3, the 
others deal with a wandering system whose evolution, never known in advance, 
depends on the support given by public policies. For the ones, inflation is the 
consequence of abusive stabilization policies, especially monetary policy4; they 
recommend strong restrictions to the instruments. For the others, inflation results 
from the conflicting distribution of national income. To tighten monetary policy in 
such a context would be inaccurate and could provoke a depression, or make it more 
serious. In addition, the supremacy the NCM grants to monetary over fiscal policy 
contrasts with the pitfalls that Keynes identified with respect to the control of the 
rates of interest, and their influence on effective demand and inflation. It contrasts 
also with the role of budgetary and fiscal policy in the Keynesian literature5. 
The paper aims to extend the reflection on Keynesian alternative for 
macroeconomic governance. It focuses on the connection between monetary and 
fiscal policy in front of the triple problem of controlling inflation, public finance and 
employment. It sheds a new light on monetary policy through analyzing 
complementarities with respect to budgetary and fiscal policy, and through the study 
of interactions between the policy mix and the distributive conflict. 
Section 2 compares the equilibrium main properties of the two theoretical 
frameworks. The functional interdependences among the different markets are 
examined methodically (goods, labour, bonds, money). We show that, despite the 
formal similarity of the system-behaviour modelling around equilibrium, there are 
strong differences in the conclusions which can be drawn from the two approaches. 
The reason is of course that the definitions of variables and parameters differ, as well 
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as the adjustment process and properties of the equilibrium. Section 3 focuses on the 
implications of such differences for the study of monetary and budgetary-fiscal 
policies interactions and complementarities in a Keynesian context. 
 
2. General equilibrium alternative theories 
We start with a simple linear model which aims to study the effects of the two types 
of governance in the short run6. Variables are expressed in terms of relative 
variations from their initial value, excepting the rate of interest and the tax rate, 
which are expressed as variations. First the NCM will be analysed in terms of general 
equilibrium. Then, the main Keynesian differences will be put forward from the 
same general equilibrium perspective. 
 
2.1. General equilibrium modelling in presumed stationary regimes 
The usual Walrasian macroeconomics is modelled at first, so as to extend the 
framework towards NCM. 
 
2.1.1. Macroeconomics in Walrasian terms 
We consider for the moment a three-market structure (goods, labour and bonds) with 
two relative prices (the real wage and the rate of interest)7. However, because of the 
Walras law, the equilibrium condition for the market of bonds will remain implicit. 
 
Labour market 
At equilibrium, variations in real wages and employment compensate for the 
marginal disutility of labour (supply side) and furthermore insure profit 
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maximisation (demand side). The marginal productivity equalization to the real cost 
of labour induces a decreasing relation between employment and real wage: 
dn +−= ρω                        (1) 
n is the relative variation in employment 
 is the relative variation in real wage (that is the quantity of goods paid in exchange 
of the labour unit) 
On the other hand, equalization of the marginal disutility of labour to the real 
wage means an increasing relation. It will be useful to reverse this relation in order to 
express the real wage as a function of the level of employment given by equation (1): 
nθω =                          (2) 
In a monetary economy, equation (2) would suppose the nominal wage variation 
(w) to depend on both the price index variation over the period (p, see below about 
the nominal price index determination in the model with money), and the additional 
labour employed if necessary: 
npw θ+=                        (2') 
These two equations insure that firms remain on their demand for labour curve, 
and that workers remain on their supply curve at equilibrium. 
 
Market for goods 
The supply of goods depends on the quantity of inputs, especially labour in the short 
run, and therefore technology will be represented as: 
cny += α                        (3) 
y is the relative variation in the quantity of output and c represents other exogenous 
technological factors. We assume <1 (diminishing marginal product of labour).  
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Equations (1) to (3) give relative variations in production, employment and real 
wages as functions of the structural parameters and exogenous variables of the 
model: 
ρθ+= 1
d
n  
c
dy +
+
=
ρθ
α
1
 
ρθθω += 1
d
 
Hence, economic activity depends only on technology and labour market conditions. 
The rate of interest insures aggregate demand for any additional production. Since 
the market equilibrium requires equal supply and demand8: 
( ) tagiy ˆˆ γϕλσ −++−=                   (4) 
g: relative variation in the government demand for goods 
tˆ : variation in the tax rate 
a: relative variation in the exogenous part of aggregate private demand 
iˆ : variation in the rate of interest 
nb  is the initial tax rate 
we get: 
( ) ( ) dagtci ρθσ
αϕ
σ
λ
σ
γ
σ +
−++−−=
1
ˆ
1
ˆ
 
This rate of interest is both the clearing market condition for bonds and, through 
equalization of saving and investment, the condition for the aggregate demand of 
goods to be equal to the aggregate supply. Notice that the tax rate, government 
expenditures and other aggregate demand components do not influence the 
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production and employment levels at equilibrium; their variations only produce 
crowding out effects through the adjustment of the interest rate. 
 
Market for money 
In this theoretic framework, money is only a transaction device, and demand for 
money varies following the volume and price of transactions. Assuming a constant 
money circulation velocity, the equilibrium condition requires any variation in the 
quantity of money (m, exogenous for the moment) to be offset by an equivalent 
variation in the demand for money: 
pym +=                         (5) 
As far as the demand for real money balances depends on real income, it depends 
on technology and labour market conditions; hence inflation results from excessive 
real money balances relative to the need for real money balances (at the previous 
prices): 
ρθ
α
+
−−=
1
d
cmp  
Other things being equal (c=d=0), prices vary in proportion to the money supply, 
without any effect on real variables and relative prices (including the rate of interest). 
 
Macroeconomic policy 
For the reason we have just mentioned, the sole valid goal that monetary policy may 
target concerns inflation control. On the other hand, budgetary and fiscal policy is 
not necessary for stabilization purposes as far as markets are supposed to work 
'perfectly'. It may however produce temporary or permanent effects on relative prices 
and real variables because of distortions on the resources allocation process. This 
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view put traditionally the economic efficiency in conflict with the fiscal 
redistributive laws on which the social order is based. 
 
2.1.2. The new synthesis 
After Keynes had demonstrated the decisive importance of expectations for 
macroeconomic analysis, the rational expectation hypothesis gave a new impulse to 
(Neo)classical economics during the seventies. It was shown that in stochastic 
stationary regimes, the main properties of the classical system continued to work 
provided that market efficiency was postulated. 'New Keynesian Economics' share 
most of this revitalized New Classical framework, even though it put forward 
nominal and real rigidities, which prevent the competitive process to work perfectly 
in the 'short run'. If nominal wages, for example, are imperfectly flexible, inflationary 
shocks temporarily move real wages and employment from their natural level. 
Demand policies may be useful in this case, but only to the extent that they use the 
surprise-inflation channel. Yet, if money can influence relative prices and other real 
variables temporary, it plays a limited role in New Keynesian Macroeconomics 
because rational expectations make it possible to predict future values of variables 
without systematic errors. Hence, as far as stochastic shocks only produce temporary 
deviations in presumed stationary regimes9, the 'long run' behaviour of the system is 
basically the same as the neoclassical one. 
 
Labour market 
Using monetary prices and wages, the demand for labour may be rewritten: 
( ) dwpn +−= ρ  
 10 
It is possible to introduce fiscal distortion effects by supposing that in the short 
run they work through the price of the variable input: replacing the nominal cost of 
labour (W) by W(1+ t), where 0<1 measures the (weakened) impact of the tax 
rate on the labour cost, profit maximisation requires Y/N=W(1+ t)/P. The demand 
for labour relative variation (n) then takes the form of a function of the fiscally-
corrected labour cost, which relative variation can be approximated by ( twp ˆξ−− ) 
for small values of tˆ : 
( ) dtwpn +−−= ˆξρ                     (1') 
We will suppose that labour contracts have been negotiated, at the starting point 
of the period, on the basis of the expected rate of inflation for the current period (pa): 
npw a θ=−                        (2'') 
From (1') we get: 
( )
ρθ
ρθξθ
+
−−−
+=
1
ˆtppdpw
a
 
( )
ρθ
ρξρ
+
−−+
=
1
tˆppd
n
a
 
Hence, if pa=p (which is assumed to be true in the 'long run', as a result of rational 
expectations in stationary regimes), employment and production are the same as in 
the previous model (forgetting the fiscal distortion effect), but in case of inflationary 
surprise (ppa), demand shocks influence the level of employment through the 
prediction error (p-pa). 
 
Market for goods 
Equations (3) and (4) being unchanged, we obtain from the expression of n above: 
( )
c
tdppy
a
+
+
−+−
=
ρθ
αρξααρ
1
ˆ
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( )( )
( ) ( ) ( ) ctag
dppi
a
σσ
γ
ρθσ
αρξϕ
σ
λ
ρθσ
ρα 1
ˆ
11
ˆ
−





−
+
+++
+
+−
−=  
Once more, the results diverge from those of the previous model only in case of 
inflationary surprise. Providing it is not expected, monetary policy recovers a 
stabilisation power. 
 
Market for money 
Using equation (5) in order to determine the behaviour of the price index, we get 
from the expression of y above: 
( ) ( ) tdpcmp a ˆ
111
1
αρρθ
ξαρ
αρρθ
ρα
αρρθ
ρθ
++
+
++
−
+−
++
+
= , for ppa 
But in the long run, for p=pa and we get: 
tdcmp ˆ
11 ρθ
ξαρ
ρθ
α
+
+
+
−−=  
Hence, as far as there are inflation surprises, money quantity variations no more 
transmit totally to the price index. Since variations in y, w, n and iˆ  depend on the 
price index and therefore on the quantity of money, classical dichotomy seems to 
have disappeared. In addition, money does not work through the channel of interest 
(, which measures the sensibility of aggregate demand to changes in the rate of 
interest, does not appear in n, neither does it in y after having replaced p). Indeed, it 
is through unpredicted variations in the price index that variations in the quantity of 
money can have real effects, including the rate of interest. 
A more sophisticated demand for money can be preferred so as to take risk into 
account10: 
ipym ˆη−+=                       (5') 
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It can easily be shown that the model globally has similar properties in this case, 
with the exception that interest channel works and government expenditures have 
real effects at equilibrium (provided that ppa, failing which the dichotomy reappears 
since employment and production are completely determined by the supply side 
equations (1'), (2") and (3)). The system therefore looks like an extended IS-LM 
framework (equations 4 and 5'), which contains a supply set of equations for 
endogenous determination of wages and prices (see the appendix n°2). 
As Lavoie (2002) pointed out, in recent versions of the new consensus monetary 
policies consist in controlling the rate of interest rather than the quantity of money, 
which has to be considered as an endogenous variable. When the central bank 
controls iˆ , the LM function only determines the quantity of money that is equal to 
the demand for money, and therefore it is possible to solve the model for real 
magnitudes without it (cf. Romer, 2000)11. 
 
 
2.2. General equilibrium modelling in a Keynesian world 
Equation (5') admits different interpretations depending on the definition of 
uncertainty. In stochastic stationary regimes, risk makes money a useful portfolio 
diversification device, as we have just mentioned. This is a step towards the 
Keynesian monetary theory, but it does not capture its essential features. Indeed, 
there is a fundamental difference in the way to manage uncertainty when dynamic 
stability is not ensured, compared with a system where agents may predict the future 
without making systematic errors. The Keynesian concept of liquidity preference is 
not captured in equation (5'); the liquidity preference does not result from any 
optimal decision concerning risk and return, which could make sense in presumed 
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stationary regimes but does not ensure that it is 'the best' solution in a Keynesian 
world. According to The General Theory (Ch. 12, s. 2), its magnitude results from 
the confidence level that people give to their expectations (whatever the distribution 
of probabilities they may make use of). 
This Keynesian specificity will be formally underlined through considering ηk as 
an exogenous variable that is subject to the kind of volatility that usually affects 
expectations: 
ipym k ˆη−+=                      (5k') 
When aggregate demand (like prices) decreases, the need for transaction-money 
falls, and the rate of interest decreases, rising the demand and the price of goods and 
moving the real wages towards their full employment level12. But, in Keynesian 
contexts, the magnitude of the decrease in interest rate (the so-called 'Keynes effect') 
and of any positive real balance effect (people do not want to hold idle cash balances 
and therefore increase the demand for goods) depends on speculative decisions 
concerning the demand for money, with the result that income and employment 
finally depend on the degree of confidence of the moment and its impact on the 
demand for money. At equilibrium, there are no competitive mechanisms which 
could move the economy towards any predetermined 'long run' solution. 
 
2.2.1. Markets articulation and Keynesian equilibrium 
Labour market 
Contrary to the case where firms are ensured to sell their production whatever the 
level, demand for labour will not be determined here by equation (1'), but by 
equation (3), which gives the variation in labour that makes the better use of the 
technology for a given level of the demand for goods. 
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Since the level of labour is fixed by the demand of firms, the supply side equation 
of the labour market must determine the equilibrium wage. In the Classical world, as 
well as in the NCM 'long run', nominal wages adjustment, together with the real-
balance effect, drives the real wages so as to ensure equality between labour supply 
and demand. The 'invisible hand' simultaneously drives the rate of interest so as to 
ensure that aggregate demand absorbs the full-employment supply of good. In such a 
world, money only can induce short run 'noises', but in a Keynesian world, shifts of 
the speculative demand for money may keep the 'invisible hand' away from full 
employment. Hence, as far as nothing in these conditions ensures the equalization of 
equilibrium real wages and marginal disutility of labour attached to a given level of 
effective demand, equation (2"), which represents the second Classical postulate, 
must be abandoned. 
How then has the equilibrium nominal wage to be determined? The General 
Theory discussion of the labour market pointed out that a decrease in wages does not 
systematically increase employment, because of the negative demand effects it may 
provoke through the expected return on capital. The existence of an equilibrium with 
under-employment means that the self-regulatory process failed, either the wages 
decrease have not been able to stimulate the effective demand or have amplified the 
depression (but in this case wages should continue to fall13), or workers have been 
able to stop the decrease in wages. We will therefore suppose that nominal wages are 
anchored in an exogenous (but variable) threshold ( w ). The current wage however 
may deviate from this threshold when certain events occur, such as a change in 
unemployment rate or exogenous disturbances: 
( )nnww fk −−= θ                     (2k) 
where nf is the rate of change of the labour force. 
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Market for goods 
Since the market equilibrium requires that firms adjust the production (y) to the 
effective demand (equation 4) and technology then determines employment 
(equation 3), employment does not result from equation (1'). This does not mean that 
firms can not adjust the marginal productivity of labour to the factor real cost, but 
only that it is not through the employment level that they can do it. Equation (1') 
actually gives the price index variation that makes firms able to remain on their 
demand for labour curve, despite the fact that the demand for labour is constrained 
by the demand for goods. When demand increases, it is through inflation that the real 
wage variation is made equal to the marginal productivity decline, prompting firms 
to raise their production in order to respond to the increasing demand. 
Without changing the formal condition expressed in equation (1'), we can rewrite 
it in accordance with the Keynesian approach to inflation: 
tynwp ˆξα +−−+=                    (1'') 
where tˆξα +−   is the rate of variation of the mark-up on unit labour cost14. 
Inflation may be caused by interest rate variations through their impact on 
aggregate demand and output, but in contrast to the NCM model, this impact does 
not require inflation surprises. In addition, inflation reveals its connection with 
labour costs, including taxes, and with the mark-up. Equation (1") also indicates that 
a positive shift in output, which reduces the productivity of labour15, does not 
necessarily imply a decline of real wages; it depends on the mark-up behaviour. Thus 
real wages may vary pro-cyclically. 
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Market for money 
Following the post-Keynesian approach to endogenous money, we will suppose that 
banks deliver the quantity of money that is demanded at the current rate of interest, 
which is influenced by the central bank decisions. However, despite the formal 
resemblance, the functioning of the market differs from the NCM one, notably 
because of the speculative demand instability. Hence, the transmission of short-term 
interest rates variations, through which the central bank may influence the long-term 
interest rates, is made uncertain. For example, lower short-term rates (increases in 
high-powered money) aiming to extend credit do not produce the same decline in 
long-term rates depending on whether the liquidity preference changes or not. When 
it rises, banks may be able to sell more credit without having to reduce their interest 
rates, for non-bank loans rates in this case tend to rise in order to compensate the 
increasing liquidity preference. Moreover, speculative behaviours also may block the 
transmission process when the current rates are considered as very low (liquidity 
trap). Thus automatic monetary rules à la Taylor turn out to be excessively optimistic 
in a Keynesian context. 
 
2.2.2. Formal similarities and fundamental discrepancies 
From a formal point of view, the differences between the two models concern 
equations (2k) and (2"), as long as LM is not explicitly represented. If, as usually 
supposed, the labour force is constant in the short run (nf=0), differences restrict to 
wages determinants ( w  or pa) and parameters ( or k) which have different 
definitions in the two models. 
Thus, apart from the postulate that shocks (ci,i, pia,ai) are temporary deviations 
from a stationary regime in the NCM model, the short run behaviour modelling of 
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non-ergodic systems seems very similar to the modelling of presumed stationary 
regimes with rational expectations. However, this formal similarity hides 
fundamental differences about the general equilibrium properties. First, the volatility 
of the demand for money (equation 5k) threatens the interest rate ability to push 
aggregate demand up to full employment at the union level (whatever way it might 
take, spontaneous competitive forces or monetary policy). Second, Keynesian 
equilibrium is driven by effective demand; there is no force of attraction towards any 
predetermined "long run" or "natural" position (in that sense, Keynesian equilibrium 
is not a temporary situation). Third, the fact that unemployment does not tend to 
reduce nominal wages beyond some exogenous limit is not a cause of 
unemployment; in certain circumstances, it can even be viewed as a protection 
against cumulative depressive forces (but a shift in unemployment may weaken the 
workers resistance, as in equation 2k). 
Other fundamental discrepancies concern the signification of inflation and the role 
of monetary policy. We have mentioned the connection between cost pushed 
inflation and demand led inflation. Indeed, inflationary effects associated to wages, 
mark-up and/or tax pressures ( 0ˆ,0,0 >>> iii tw α ) in equation (1’'), depend on the 
way monetary authorities will pass them on effective demand. Inflation develops if 
the central bank satisfies the additional demand for money induced by cost pressures, 
in order for example to stabilize the rate of interest. If on the contrary monetary 
authorities aim to stabilize the price index, they do not prevent the rise of interest 
rates, so as to offset the inflationary effects of increasing costs through a depressive 
impact on effective demand. Hence, recurrent distributive conflicts, whatever the 
reason (wage-profit sharing, fiscal pressures), force monetary policy into dilemma: to 
accept the inflationary consequences and preserve economic activities, or to depress 
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economic activity in order to stabilize the real value of money through a non-
temporary pressure of unemployment on wages. In the Keynesian context, monetary 
policy is involved in the determination of equilibrium and income distribution; it is 
not a simple stabilization device for self-regulated systems. 
 
3. Alternative macro-governance approaches 
According to the NCM, debt monetization and willingness to get extra output are the 
primary causes of inflation. Solutions stem from governance principles like central 
bank independency and public deficit limitation, which aim to prevent central banks 
to create more money that needed for making transactions at current prices. Whereas 
such principles seem suitable in a stationary system, they can deteriorate the situation 
in the presence of Keynesian unemployment. This section compares the main 
implications of the NCM governance in both presumed stationary regimes and 
Keynesian regimes. 
 
3.1. NCM governance 
The type of governance that is suggested by the NCM is based on targets that are 
defined in relation to the expected trajectory of the economy. Temporary deviations 
of the rate of interest may be decided for stabilization purposes, in such a way that 
the quantity of money evolves in concert with the demand induced by the economic 
growth, without inflation pressures. Conversely, policies that aim systematically to 
get extra output through inflation surprise or debt monetization are fully predictable 
and therefore inefficient; they only feed the inflation core. Consequently, the new 
consensus pleads in favour of central bank political independence and low inflation 
targeting. In addition, according to the 'unpleasant monetarist arithmetic' that Sargent 
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& Wallace [1981] pointed out, public deficit limitations are necessary for the 
credibility and efficiency of monetary policy. 
 
3.1.1. Modelling macroeconomic governance within the new synthesis vision of the 
world 
In order to draw some analytical conclusions from the model, let us assume that 
credible institutions ensure there is no inflation bias, so that active monetary policy 
only aims to stabilize the system by means of (non-systematic) inflation surprise 
(ppa)16. Since the central bank is credible, private agents anchor their expectation on 
the announced inflation target. However, in front of a shock, authorities deviate from 
the target in order to stabilize employment, with a magnitude which depends on their 
degree of 'Conservatism' about inflation. 
Fiscal authorities for their part have a budget balance target related to their 
financial policy and debt management constraints. As well as monetary authorities, 
they concede temporary deviations according to their degree of 'Orthodoxy'. 
The appendix n°2 (case b) shows that in the model of endogenous money, 
monetary, budgetary and fiscal instruments ( tgi ˆ,,ˆ ) influence the equilibrium value 
of output, employment and prices. Hence they influence also the budget balance (b, 
see the appendix n°3): 
( ) tgyb ˆ+−= ϕ                       (6) 
We suppose that the deviations of instruments are decided with respect to 
employment deviations. The short run objectives will be: 
nb ψ=                          (7) 
np β−=                         (8) 
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Equation (8) for example means that, in order to stabilize the economic activity, a 
positive (negative) temporary deviation of the price index is accepted in case of a 
negative (positive) deviation from the natural rate of employment. Parameters 0 
and 	0 represent respectively the monetary 'Conservatism' and the fiscal 
'Orthodoxy'. =0 means that there are no short run deviations from the inflation 
target (full 'Conservatism'). 	=0 means that the budget deficit (or surplus) depends 
only on financial long run considerations, and do not participate in stabilization 
operations. 
This way of modelling policy rules simplifies algebra, but it is consistent with the 
usual loss-function minimisation procedure17. 
Starting from equations (1"), (2"), (3) and (4), and provided that the government 
changes expenditures for example, rather than taxes, in order to reach its objective, 
we get: 
( ) ( )
( )
( )
( )
( ) tcpg
a
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1
1
1
1
1 αθβϕ
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Public expenditures only respond to supply shocks, and if necessary to fiscal 
changes. The reason is that monetary policy neutralizes the effects of demand shocks 
on output and prices, as the solutions attest: 
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with the result that government reaches its objective without having to move its 
instrument, since employment and fiscal revenues remain unchanged. 
Finally, because they work through aggregate demand channels, public expenditures 
and interest rate reactions protect the economy against demand shocks, but only yield 
imperfect management of supply shocks. It is of interest to note that temporary 
changes of the fiscal distortion level can usefully improve the policy mix, since they 
make possible to cancel the effects of the shocks on prices and employment without 
budget balance deterioration: 
0ˆ ===−+= bnppct
a
ξ
α
 
That is the reason why deficits limitations are not really considered by the NCM 
as obstacles to stabilization. 
 
3.1.2. New governance in a Keynesian world 
What kind of consequences may have such governance principles in a Keynesian 
situation of unemployment? In order to answer the question, let the exogenous 
variable q represent the variation in employment that is initially required for full 
employment. Since n is the variation in employment for the current period, q-n 
measures the level of unemployment at the end of the period. As authorities think 
that q reflects the natural rate of unemployment ( w ,c,α , and a are supposed to 
provoke temporary deviations from the trajectory), they do not take it as a 
stabilization matter, and make the policy discussed in Section 3.1.1. 
The formal results of the previous section can be easily adapted to the present 
configuration when the labour force remains unchanged during the current period 
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(nf=0), provided we replace equation (2") by equation (2k), which only supposes that 
w  and k replace pa and ). It follows that, in the most favourable case where 
authorities can completely stabilize the price index and the activity level without 
budget balance deterioration, unemployment remains blocked at its initial level (q-
n=q). Thus, as long as the actual level of unemployment is the target level, the policy 
mix tends to perpetuate unemployment. 
In less favourable cases, authorities have not enough room for manoeuvre in terms 
of taxes-expenditures capacity of adjustment and interest rate control, with the result 
that effective demand depressions can not be offset totally. The problem is all the 
more serious since Keynesian unemployment does not tend spontaneously towards 
any predetermined ‘long run value’, contrary to what authorities think, with the result 
that they take the new rate of unemployment as the new natural one. That suggests a 
different explanation of what New Keynesians have referred to as unemployment 
hysteresis18: restricted policy-mix reactions to effective demand depressions only 
weaken the rise of unemployment, but subsequently neither market forces nor 
economic policy tends to restore the initial level. Actually, as far as wages respond to 
the variations in unemployment, not to its level, the NCM concludes to real wages 
rigidity, hiding by the way what in fact is a lack of policy mix flexibility (remember 
that wage flexibility does not ensure better results in the Keynesian thought). 
Things may even be worsen when recurrent distributive tensions exist, because 
the central bank tends to raise the rate of interest according to the conflict intensity. 
Indeed, as long as persistent inflationary pressures are interpreted as the result of a 
'natural' lower demand for money (provided the supply did not rise), monetary policy 
takes a harder line and becomes a depressive force. 
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Thus, despite the fact that the two theoretical approaches share the same 
objectives in the field of macroeconomic governance (that is full employment, prices 
stability and sound public finance), stationary-regime designed governance may be 
singularly inappropriate in a Keynesian world. 
 
3.2. Keynesian macroeconomic governance 
Controlling inflation 
Even though inflation always comes from a gap between the money supply and the 
demand for money expressed at current prices, it is instructive to consider the causes 
of the gap. For example, according to the real balance effect, a decrease in effective 
demand may produce inflation insofar as it reduces the demand for money. This is 
quite different from surprise inflation or seigniorage; it takes part in the adjustment 
process towards equilibrium. It develops especially when wages rigidity impedes the 
adjustment of real wages. It would be strange if monetary policy aimed to fight 
inflation after a demand depression when wages are rigid. Central banks rather tend 
to decrease interest rates in such cases, so as to facilitate the adjustment. New and old 
Keynesians could agree on this, despite the former consider effective demand 
failures as temporary shocks. 
Another source of inflation is the conflict about income distribution. Mainstream 
economics interprets distributive tensions in terms of stochastic supply shocks or in 
terms of structural change (if they are recurrent), never as a moving compromise 
which interacts with other economic decisions. Insofar as, by assumption, economic 
agents may freely adjust their plan to the perceived market real prices, a 
disagreement about nominal earnings, given expected future prices, takes the form of 
a supply-cut at current prices. That comes to an increase in the natural rate of 
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unemployment. If the central bank aims to smooth the depressive effects on output, it 
can be driven to temporarily create money, so as to compensate the supplementary 
need for transaction money which is induced by (temporary) tensions. But, in the 
long run, monetary policy can not avoid the depressive effects of negative supply 
shocks. As concerns recurrent (then foreseeable) pressures, the central bank could 
not repetitively smooth the negative effects on the supply side, because recurrent 
inflationary measures would be expected, and therefore would not deliver real 
effects. 
The Keynesian point of view about this question is quite different, even though 
the results are similar. First, section 2.2.2 showed that in the presence of recurrent 
distributive tensions, low inflation targeting may introduce a deflationary bias into 
monetary policy, with non-temporary higher unemployment, what contrasts with the 
neutrality of money in the NCM "long run". In addition, when strong tensions 
compel the central bank to restrict monetary policy, high unemployment may drive 
the governments to accept high deficits in a context of high interest rates. On the 
contrary, safe distributive conditions help monetary policy to contain interest rates 
and to contribute to the policy mix efficiency (see below). 
Hence, monetary policy is not always the unique way, nor is it the best, to control 
inflation; legal and institutional rules concerning income distribution play a crucial 
role as well. Actually, the two aspects should not be considered separately. 
Inflation control raises additional problems in monetary unions, for the same 
monetary policy applies in all member countries, regardless of where inflationary 
pressures started. Furthermore, interest rate interactions with national budgetary-
fiscal policies have to be taken into account. The following section discusses this 
point. 
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3.2.2. Governing according to the context 
In non-ergodic systems, macroeconomic governance should not hinge on mechanic 
rules whose consequences are supposed being well known and able to reach 
predefined targets. It is always possible to have ideal objectives, but it is not always 
reasonable to make it the short run target of a policy mix because economic policy 
may spark changes in expectations and private economic decisions, which may in 
turn make the policy inappropriate (as popularized the Lucas critique)19. Keynesian 
context requires pragmatic governance, which goes through intermediate targets in 
order to avoid jolts that could destabilize private expectations and decisions. 
Formally, such an approach suggests replacing equation (7), which fixed the 
government objective in the NCM model, by a condition of the type: 
10 ≤<
=
µ
µ qn
                       (9) 
where 
 is a parameter that the government chooses in function of the confidence he 
has in the success of operations. It is important to bear in mind that this equation, like 
most equations of Keynesian models, does not pretend to the stability that is usually 
assumed. Indeed 
 is subject to various changing factors. Some of them concern the 
effective demand expected sensitivity to the policy instruments; others depend on 
financial constraints which may limit the government room for manoeuvre, others 
may add political considerations (e.g. public opinion)... In this perspective, 
economic-policy designing hinges as much on the selection of the objective (value of 

) as on the adjustment of instruments (value of g or tˆ  which solves equation (9), 
given equations (1"), (2k), (3) and (4)). 
Nevertheless, since the budget balance depends on the short run employment 
objective, the government may have to limit the increase in public expenditures, 
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unless it is able to adjust taxes. Consequently, employment and budget balance 
objectives, as well as the concerned instruments, turn out to be interdependent, and 
therefore must be simultaneously chosen. Hence, let us suppose that the budget-
balance target depends more or less on the magnitude of unemployment (according 
to the room for manoeuvre of the period and to the relative importance the 
government gives to employment...): 
( ) znqb k +−−= ψ                     (10) 
where 	k0 represents the 'fiscal flexibility' (the higher 	k is, the less the government 
adjusts taxes, and the higher is the deficit), and z represents other factors which may 
interfere in the short run, like deliberate structural deficit due to long run public 
investments or debt management considerations. Once again, the problem as much 
concerns the selection of the objective (value of 	k) as the adjustment of instrument 
(value of tˆ  or g which solves equation (10)). 
It is then possible to determine the pair (g, tˆ ) which solves conditions (9) and (10), 
given equations (1"), (2
 k), (3) and (4): 
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Within this framework, budgetary and fiscal policy works as a flexible anchor 
around full employment (since 
 may vary). Actually, because of effective demand 
and employment sensitivity to the interest rate, the move of instruments required by 
conditions (9) and (10) depends on the monetary policy. Of course interest rates also 
matter for the choice of objectives (
i,	ki). For example, if the government thinks that 
the central bank will accommodate, it can adopt a more ambitious plan. Thus, the 
central bank can make it more or less difficult for the government to reach the 
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objectives. Notice that central bank participation to economic recovery does not 
absolutely necessitate lower interest rates. Remember that 0ˆ =i , for example, means 
that banks adjust the supply of money to the demand expressed at the unchanged rate 
of interest. Thus, even when the central bank can not significantly reduce the interest 
rates (if, for example, they are already very low), it can help in a decisive way by 
controlling the monetary tensions that economic recovery usually provokes. 
 
Conclusion 
Modelling the NCM and Keynesian approaches of competitive economies within the 
usual four-macro-markets representation reveals some key sources of divergence. In 
particular, Keynesian uncertainty plays a crucial role through speculative money 
demand instability and interest rate adjustment, and through the leadership of 
effective demand. Hence market interactions differ, with the result that the optimum-
oriented competitive forces work in ergodic regimes, not in the Keynesian 
representation of the world. 
Because the NCM governance was designed for efficient stationary systems, it 
carries several drawbacks when implemented in Keynesian non-ergodic systems. In 
the presence of Keynesian unemployment, as long as actual unemployment and 
interest rates are interpreted as 'natural' rates, they serve as macroeconomic policy 
targets, in such a way that the policy mix may anchor the system away from full 
employment. The situation persists for it seems to be the consequence of real wages 
rigidity. Our argument suggests a Keynesian explanation (which involves 
inappropriate economic policy) of what New Keynesians have referred to as 
unemployment hysteresis. Things may even be made worse by distributive tensions, 
because the rate of interest tends to rise according to the conflict intensity. Indeed, 
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since inflationary pressures are interpreted as the result of a 'natural' lower demand 
for money (provided the supply did not rise), monetary policy takes a harder line and 
becomes a depressive force. 
Unfortunately, difficulties do not vanish when authorities adopt the Keynesian 
vision of the world. For example, as regards inflation control, recurrent distributive 
tensions force monetary policy into dilemma: to accept the inflationary consequences 
and preserve economic activities, or to depress economic activity in order to preserve 
the real value of money through permanent unemployment pressure on wages. From 
this point of view, legal and institutional rules concerning the distribution of income 
reveals to be of primary importance, which corroborates the idea that economic 
efficiency at the macro level, far from being the automatic outcome of free 
competitive forces, should not be considered independently of the political and social 
context. 
Governance principles in accordance with the non-ergodic approach have been 
explored in the last part of the paper. In contrast with the automatic policy rules of 
the NCM, we put forward a pragmatic and progressive approach to macroeconomic 
policy that avoids destabilizing expectations and private decisions. In such a 
framework, authorities fix intermediate reasonable targets with respect to the 
confidence they have in the chance of success, which depends on the actual context 
and moves with it. In our simplified modelling, the taxes-expenditures combination 
that is required to reach employment and budgetary targets depends on a set of 
variables and parameters that represent the macroeconomic changing context and the 
confidence of authorities. This set of variables of course contains the rate of interest, 
which expresses the monetary influences on the policy mix. Monetary policy 
modelling is very sensitive in a Keynesian world because the control of long term 
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rate of interest is uncertain, at least as far as reductions are concerned; but even when 
its positive influence on effective demand is doubtful, it matters indirectly through 
avoiding increases in interest rates when fiscal and budgetary policy aims to 
stimulate effective demand. 
 
 
 
Appendix n°1 
Starting from the aggregate demand function ( ) ( ) AGpitYY a ++−−− +1βυ , where Y 
represents the output volume, i the rate of interest, pa+1 the expected inflation rate till 
the next period, t the tax rate (taxes/output),  the propensity to consume, G the 
governments expenditures, A an autonomous component, the market for goods 
equilibrium requires: ( ) ( ) AGpitYYY a ++−−−= +1βυ . 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 (with d=0 and dpa+1=0), and 
dividing by Y0, we get: 
0000
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Y
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υυυ  
Since t0=T0/Y0, the equality dG/Y0=t0dG/G  holds when the budget is balanced 
(T0=G0). Writing relative deviation rates with small letters (x=dX/X0), except 
a=dA/Y0, we have: 
( ) agtdi
Y
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0
01
β
υυ  
hence: 
( ) tagiy ˆˆ γϕλσ −++−=  
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Appendix n°2 
a) The model lends itself to an analysis in terms of aggregate supply and aggregate 
demand. Equations (4) and (5') give the demand equation y(p), which may be written 
as p(y): 
( ) ( )
m
tagyp +−+++−=
σ
ηγϕηλση ˆ
 
Equations (1'), (2"), and (3) give the supply equation: 
( )
c
tdppy
a
+
+
−+−
=
ρθ
αρξααρ
1
ˆ
 
Resolution yields y and p, which permits to solve for n by (3), then w by (2"), and 
finally iˆ  by (5'). Remember that output variations do not really depend on current 
price index variations, but on the current price index error of prediction, as the 
supply equation shows. 
b) When monetary authorities control the rate of interest and adjust the quantity of 
money to the demand, output (y) is determined by the sole aggregate demand 
components (equation 4). We get n by (3), then w by (2") and finally p by (1'): 
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α
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Output variations here depend on the rate of interest, but it can easily be shown that 
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if it is set so as to avoid any price index error of prediction (p=pa), then the results 
are the same as in the case of exogenous money supply where m is set so as to avoid 
errors of prediction. 
 
Appendix n°3 
The budget balance (B) is defined as: 
B=tPY-PG 
Differentiating around a solution indexed by 0 yields: 
dB=t0P0dY+P0Y0dt+t0Y0dP-P0dG-G0dP 
and dividing by the initial value of output: 
dB/(P0Y0)=t0dY/Y0+dt+t0dP/P0-dG/Y0-(G0/Y0)(dP/P0) 
Hence, around a situation of balanced budget where t0=G0/Y0 (remember g=dG/G0): 
b=t0(y-g)+dt 
and, with the same notation as in appendix n°1: 
( ) tgyb ˆ+−= ϕ  
 
 
Notes 
1 This kind of policy aims to maintain the rate of unemployment below the natural 
rate. It differs from occasional (not expected) policies, which may have temporary 
impact on economic activities because of inertia of wages (see below). 
2 This may occur because of the overcrowding of installed capacity and the lack of 
some skills of labour and goods (including capital goods) in some industries. 
3 The system may jump from a trajectory to another, when the regime changes. 
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4 See the discussion of the relation between inflation targeting and the NCM in 
Arestis & Sawyer (2003a). 
5 See Arestis and Sawyer (2003b). 
6 The short run we are discussing now is the one for which capital stock and 
productive capacity may approximately be considered as constants. It is different 
from the 'short run' mentioned in the introduction. 
7 Had the model an additional market for money, there would have been a third 
relative price (the price of money in terms of goods: 1/p). As we know, in such a 
system real prices and other real variables are independent of money (which only 
accounts for nominal variables and prices; see below). 
8 See the appendix n° 1. 
9 This point supposes that competitive mechanisms anchor the system in a 
predetermined trajectory. It has been identified as the dynamic stability of a 
stochastic process (ergodicity). See Vercelli (1991) pp. 40, 154, and Davidson (2002) 
pp.39, 69. 
10 Following Tobin (1958), money helps to diversify portfolios in order to optimize 
the return / risk ratio (the higher the rate of interest, the more one is encouraged to 
increase the proportion of risked assets, and to reduce the proportion of money). 
11 See the case b) of the appendix n°2. As stated Palley (2006), this assessment of 
endogenous money substantially differs from the post-Keynesian one. 
12 Theoretically, it is possible that flexible nominal wages reach this solution 
without any variation in the rate of interest (but it is not certain; see The General 
Theory, Ch. 19): through positive effects on the marginal efficiency of capital and 
effective demand, wage flexibility may produce inflation, reduce real wage and rise 
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production. If on the other hand nominal wages are sticky, the role of interest rate 
becomes crucial. 
13 See Tobin (1975) and Palley (2005) about this kind of instability. 
14 It is not essential to make imperfect competition assumptions in order to obtain a 
mark-up relation. For example, starting with the production function Y=CN, <1, 
competitive pricing requires the marginal productivity to be equal to the real cost of 
labour: Y/N=W(1+t)/PP=W(1+t)/(CN-1)=(WN(1+t)/Y)/; hence, by 
differentiation of the associated logarithmic expression (for small values of tˆ ), we 
have tynwp ˆξα +−−+=  , where α  is the rate of variation in  (exogenous). 
Notice that an increasing mark-up on unit labour cost expresses in this case a 
declining wages-output ratio ( 0<α ) and/or increasing fiscal taxes ( 0ˆ >= dtt ). 
15 From equation (3), we have: y-n=(-1)n+c. Hence, an increase in effective 
demand and employment reduces the productivity of labour (that is c constant), and 
rises the unit cost of production. This shows that cost pushed inflation and demand 
led inflation may express the same reality. In fact, whatever apparent causes it has, 
inflation always requires an increase in demand (see below, Section 2.2.2). 
16 According to the no-inflation-bias hypothesis we should have in general pa=0, but 
it may be useful to conserve this variable as an exogenous temporary shocks on 
expected inflation. 
17 For example, the first order condition that g must verify in order to minimize 
L=(1/2)(n²+b²) is n(n/g)+b(b/g)=0, which is equivalent to b=	n provided that 
	=-(n/g)/(b/g). This approach sometimes raises difficulties that will not be 
discussed here. 
18 On hysteresis, ergodic and non-ergodic regimes, see the Minisymposium in the 
Journal of Post Keynesian Economics, 15(3), Spring 1993. 
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19 Keynes raised the question in The General Theory (Ch. 15, see the last third of 
Section II). Of course, the meaning and implications considerably differ owing to the 
methodological opposition (see Vercelli, 1991). 
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